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Wilner: Polygraphy: Short Circuit to Truth?
POLYGRAPY: SHORT CIRCUIT TO TRUTH?
"If ever there is devised a psychological test for the evaluation of
witnesses, the court will run to meet it."
-Wigmore (1923)
INTRODUCTION

Polygraphy, or lie-detection, is a technique purporting to detect whether
a subject is engaging in deception during a stylized interview in a clinical
setting.' The term "polygraph" refers to the apparatus used to measure and
record fluctuations in selected physiological indicia. Through a procedure
that has been practiced for some 40 years, 2 peculiar fluctuations are isolated
and identified, then correlated with specific interview questions to indicate
whether the questions were answered truthfully. Despite the obvious appeal
of such a technique, polygraphy has met with only sporadic scientific and
judicial acceptance, and the admission of polygraphic evidence in court
continues to be a rarity.Polygraphy has precipitated diverse reactions. Proponents 4 insist it is
an indispensible "scientific informer" in the war against criminality and
chaos, 5 contending that "[p]olygraphy seeks only the truth at all levels, fairly,
impartially and objectively, without concern about race . . . or political
affiliations."6 Through the truth, the innocent will be released and the guilty
convicted. Therefore, courts should accept polygraphic evidence with little
hesitation. Detractors 7 of the technique assert that its effectiveness in detect1. Polygraphy attempts to diagnose the consciousness of deception in a subject through
the skillful analysis of physiological change. Change is measured by a polygraph, a multipenned instrument that, in modern form, measures (I) blood pressure at the brachial
artery with a sphigmamanometer, (2) respiration with a length-sensitive cuff reporting
circumference of the abdomen above the diaphragm, (3)skin resistance to electric current
with an ammeter and a constant voltage source attached to the fingertips, and (4) gross
muscular movement with a roller-bearing stand under the subject's seat. If appropriate
questions are asked, characteristic responses will be detected and interpreted by the
examiner as evidence of deception. The most comprehensive description of polygraphy
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2. The current form of the polygraph evolved in the middle 1930's with the research
of Larson. See J. LARSON, supra note 1. For a brief history of the polygraph, see J. REID,
supra note 1, at 10-22.
3. The tradition of inadmissibility began with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), and has remained virtually unbroken. See cases cited note 18 infra.
AND
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4. See, e.g., R.

FERGUSON, THE SCIENTIFIC INFORMER

(1971); Kaplan, The Lie Detector

and Its Place in the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381 (1964); Lykken, Psychology
& the Lie Detector Industry, 29 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 725-39 (1974); Wicker, The Polygraphic
Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711 (1953).
5. See, e.g., R. FERGUSON, supra note 4.
6. Id. at 32.
7. See, Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARV. L. REV. 683
(1956); Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection,
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ing deception has never been verified, either theoretically8 or empirically.9
Even if it could be shown to be reliable, they assert, it is undignified and
offensive, unduly prejudicial when used in court, and would replace the
jury system with trial by machine.'0
Polygraphy is a combination of scientific measurement and human evaluation. It is scientific in that it purports to use objective criteria -the readings
of a diagnostic instrument-to detect deception. However, polygraphy has
not achieved complete scientific objectivity. Human judgment in the role
of the examiner is intrinsic to the method,"' and therefore, perhaps, human
error is equally intrinsic.
How then should a court evaluate such a combination of scientific
measurement and human evaluation? If the technique of polygraphy involved
a machine only, blinking green or red as it diagnosed truth or deception, a
court might apply the same standards for admitting it into evidence as
has been applied to other purely scientific techniques. In fact, polygraphic
evidence is usually evaluated by this standard, known as the "general
scientific acceptance" standard, which coincidentally originated in a polygraph
case. 12 But if polygraphy involved expert judgment only, without instrumental aid, it would seem anomalous to treat it as another scientific test;
rather, it should be treated as expert testimony and evaluated for admission
as is all other such testimony." Polygraphy is, however, neither exclusively
scientific nor exclusively human, and much confusion surrounding its use
in court has originated from its hybrid character. This note seeks to explore
the nature of polygraphy and the appropriateness of the standards used to
evaluate its evidentiary use in courts.
THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE STANDARD

The first recorded attempt to introduce a deception test into evidence
occurred in Frye v. United States. 4 Accused of murder, the defendant
proffered the favorable results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test,"
a precursor of the polygraph test. 15 Although agreeing that "when a scientific
70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961); Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 CoLUm. L. REv.
1120 (1973).
8. See text accompanying notes 31-39 infra.

9. See text accompanying notes 25-30 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 73-96 infra.
12. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

13. See Fa. R. Evm. 702 and note 102 infra.
14. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
15. The test sought to be introduced was an early technique developed in 1917 by
W.M. Marston, consisting of intermittent systolic blood pressure measurements during a
stylized interview. A characteristic rise in blood pressure was seen to coincide with a
deceptive response. Much sensitivity was added to the technique by J.A. Larson, who
replaced intermittent measurements with continuous monitoring of blood pressure. He
developed the first real polygraph, or "psycho-pneumocardiograph," when he added a
capacity for monitoring respiration. Larson, who was a medical doctor and a police
scientist, also initiated the first systematic study of polygraph responses to deception
and demonstrated the usefulness of the instrument to the satisfaction of the police. See
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principle . . . crosses the line between the experimental and the
demonstrable . . . the evidential force . . . must be recognized,"16 the court

held that recognition would be proper only if the principle was shown to be
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."17
The Frye general acceptance test has been widely approved where polygraphic or other scientific evidence is presented. In application, however,
the use of the general acceptance standard has resulted, almost without
exception, in exclusion of the evidence.18 When a scientific technique is
newly discovered, courts may feel unable to independently evaluate its
effectiveness or worth. The general acceptance test is a method of indirect
evaluation that does not require volumes of technical, often conflicting
expert testimony, but instead requires evidence that the technique in question
has gained general acceptance in the scientific community-a factual
determination that courts can more easily and comfortably make. However,
in adopting this method of indirect evaluation, courts should understand
which types of techniques will likely gain general acceptance in the scientific
community and which will not.
The Community
Whether a technique enjoys general acceptance depends in large degree
upon what is chosen as the "particular field in which [the technique]
generally J. LARSON, supra note 1. Further instrumental refinements were made by Keeler
(detection of skin conductivity) and Reid (detection of gross muscular movements). See
generally, J. REID, supra note 1, at 205-18.
16. 293 F. at 1014.
17. Id.
18. Some of the more frequently cited decisions refusing polygraphic evidence because
of its lack of scientific acceptance: United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 995 (1974) (traditional view); United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (same); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp.
37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), aff'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (established rule); United States ex. rel.
Sadowy v. Fay, 89 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 284 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 850 (1960) (New York rule); United States ex. rel. Szocki v. Cavell, 156 F. Supp. 79
(W.D. Pa. 1957); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) (dicta); Codie v. State,
313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975) (dicta); Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 832 (1954); State v. Curtis, 281 So. 2d 514 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Stack v. State,
234 Ga. 19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975); People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d. 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963);
Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W. 755 (Ky. 1960); People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72
N.W.2d 269 (1955); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952); Pereira v.
Pereira, 35 N.Y.2d 301, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148, 319 N.E.2d 413 (1974); People v. Guerin, 366
N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1975); People v. Dobler, 29 Misc. 2d 481, 215 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Suffolk
County Ct. 1961); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); State v. Jackson, 24
N.C. App. 394, 210 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 215 S.E.2d 123 (1975); State v. Smith,
113 Ohio App. 461, 178 N.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1960); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45,
230 P.2d 495 (Crim. App. 1951); Reed v. State, 522 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);
Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). But see United States v.
DeBetham, 348 F.Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972) cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); United States v. Zieger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), ren'd
per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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belongs."' 9 Newly discovered techniques may not be readily attributed to a
particular field. Controversial methods may gain acceptance among limited
groups, and assessment of general acceptance may reflect inclusion or exclusion of these groups. Few guidelines exist to help a court decide which
groups should be polled for acceptance; in fact, determination of acceptance
may be merely a battle between experts representing different camps.
The Frye court believed that the "physiological and psychological authorities" must be consulted to evaluate polygraphy. 20 In deciding what
constituted the relevant scientific community, the court must have used its
own understanding of the nature of polygraphy. There is no indication that
any evidence was presented to aid the court in this choice. However, the
relationship between the technique and the relevant scientific community
is a technical question that the court should not attempt to answer without
the benefit of expert testimony.
The history of science reflects a trend toward increased specialization. 21
Progress in science has not waited for approval from the older disciplines,
and there are new areas of understanding with unique theoretical bases that
cannot expect verification from the traditional scientific fields. Practitioners
of polygraphy have developed, in one sense, a science of their own.
Accordingly, some courts have accepted polygraphy as a field in itself, viewing
trained polygraph examiners as scientific authorities in their own right,
2
regardless of their academic credentials in psychology or physiology. 2
Although restricting the community to a narrow discipline consisting of
polygraphy experts makes the choice of the relevant scientific community
easier 23 and the finding of general acceptance among that group more likely,
it also removes some of the scientific objectivity necessary to screen out the
transient and faddish from the substantial and sound. Clearly, the smaller
and more homogenous the group used to evaluate acceptance, the greater
the danger that techniques enjoying only parochial acceptance will be unwisely admitted.
GeneralAcceptance
When courts require that a scientific test gain general acceptance within
a relevant scientific community, they substitute the judgment of a group
of experts for their own. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the requirements of general acceptance, which will vary depending on the group
of experts used. No group, however, will accept a technique unless (1) it
has usefulness, (2) it has a degree of accuracy, and, (3) depending on the
group, the technique can be explained according to some theoretical basis.

19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Id.
21. See H. HiMsWoRTH, THE DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF SCIENTIrIc KNOWLEDGE (1970).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1009 (1969); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973); United States v,
DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
23. See text accompanying notes 40-42, infra,
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(1) Usefulness. Usefulness is an obvious prerequisite to acceptance, but
it is often overlooked. Natural science seldom concerns itself with the
determination of truthfulness of testimony; unless the polygraph is a specific
subject of study, a scientist may never have occasion to evaluate it. What is
studied often depends upon the availability of funds, so timeliness and
fashionability may, more than validity, lead to acceptance. Thus, functional
eccentricity, not inaccuracy, may have relegated the polygraph to a mere
oddity among scientists. 24 If this be the case, courts should begin to evaluate
polygraphy on their own.
(2) Accuracy. Accuracy indicates how successfully a test measures what
it seeks to measure. How accurate a test must be to be worthwhile in any
given application depends upon a number of factors, including the expense
and risks involved in the test, the availability of alternate tests, and the
importance of the results. The use of polygraphic evidence at trial presents
substantial risk if the test is inaccurate. In contrast, in scientific or experimental contexts substantially less accuracy may be required. However, a test
that does not offer an improvement over diagnosis by chance is useless in
25
any context.
Accuracy is often expressed quantitatively as the number of successful
diagnoses divided by the total attempts of diagnosis. The use of expert testimony exposes courts to estimates of accuracy, and although these estimates
seldom reveal their exact. sources, 26 they most frequently indicate a range
of accuracy of 75-99%, a range of error of 1-25%, and a range of uncertainty
or indeterminacy of 5-20%.27 This would seem to indicate an accuracy clearly
superior to chance. However, these figures are oversimplistic and can be
inaccurate. Consider the following test situations:

24. Functional eccentricity appears to play a large role in selecting topics that are
acceptable for scientific research. Certain topics may be in vogue, while others taboo, for
reasons relating to the scientific community as a sociological group. See J. TAYLOR, THE
SCIENTIFIC

COMMUNITY

(1973); W.

HAGSTROM,

THE

SCIENTIFIC

COMMUNITY

(1965).

This

phenomenon appears to play a major role in the rejection of the polygraph by scientists.
25. For example, a coin flip would yield a correct result 50% of the time. If a
test cannot offer more than 50% accuracy it offers no improvement over chance.
26. Most testimony about the accuracy of the procedure is the estimate of a veteran
operator. As familiar with the procedure as these men may be (Reid estimates he has
given 35,000 polygraph tests), the estimates are not made under conditions of adequate
control, and the possibility of bias cannot be overlooked. J. REID, supra note 1, at 234. So
serious is the dearth of sound evidence about reliability that the court in Pulakis v.
State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alas. 1972) remarked: "The central problem regarding admissibility
is not that polygraph evidence has been proved unreliable, but that polygraph proponents
have not yet developed persuasive data demonstrating its reliability."
27. The figures quoted are from State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 738 n. 12, 216
N.W.2d 8, 12 n. 12 (1974), citing numerous other sources. See also United States v. DeBetham,
348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (range of accuracy: 80-91%); United States v. Ridling,
350 F. Supp. 90, 92 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (1% error; 6% inconclusive); United States v. Lanza,
356 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (10% inconclusive; 0.1% demonstrable operator error;
testimony of John Reid).
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POPULATION A
Class X
(Liars)

TmSr IA

TEST 2A

50

correct
incorrect
uncertain
Class Y
(Non-liars)

correct

POPULATION B

TEST 2B

10

45 (90%)

45(90%)

9(90%)

0
5

45 (90%)

1
0

45 (90%)

90

81(90%)

incorrect

6

5

9

uncertain
a

5
90%

0
90%

0
90%

100%

100%

50%

al

All of the above tests are 90 percent accurate, but they would not be
equally acceptable when applied in different contexts. For example, if these
were the results of medical tests given to screen a population for disease
(class X = diseased; class Y = healthy), each test might be equally acceptable
because each identifies correctly 90 percent of the disease carriers. The costs
of incorrectly identifying a healthy individual as diseased would presumably
be low, since additional confirmatory tests would be available. However,
when applied in a judicial setting for the purpose of truth finding, the
costs of labeling a truthful response as deceptive are high. This suggests
that the index of importance in the judicial context should not be what
percentage of the population is correctly identified, but what percentage of
those identified as deceptive have been incorrectly identified. This figure is
represented by the conditional accuracy, a'. In test IA, 45 deceptive responses
are found and all of these are indeed deceptive, so a' here is 100 percent.
Test 2B, in contrast, identifies 18 individuals as deceptive, but only 9 of these
are genuine, the other half having been misdiagnosed as truthful individuals.
The conditional accuracy a' is here only 50%. This means that of any given
person identified as deceptive, the probability that he is really deceptive is
only one in two. Despite the fact this test is 90 percent accurate, it probably
involves unacceptable risk in a judicial setting.28
Furthermore, the accuracy figures given to courts may be misleading
because they may be derived from controlled experiments. According to one
court:
[E]xperiments [yielding meaningful data on the accuracy of polygraph
examiners' opinions] . . . will be difficult to design in such a way that
their results will be generalizable to criminal investigation, and scientific
research to obtain meaningful data 29will be difficult to perform on
actual cases of criminal investigation.

28. In fact, the conditional accuracy can be made as low as desired by reducing the
percentage of liars in the population. Only when the percentage of liars and the
percentage of non-liars are equal does the conditional accuracy of a correct diagnosis
equal the ordinance accuracy. See Skolnick, supra note 7, at 717.
29. Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 n.29 (Alas. 1970).
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The controlled conditions of an experiment apparently fail to instill sufficient
concern over detection by the witness to allow the proper operation of the
polygraph.30 In addition, direct evaluation in real situations is at best uncertain, because no independent method usually exists for evaluating what
was in fact the truth.
(3) Theoretical sufficiency. Among scientists there may be uneasiness
about techniques that are not successfully explainable within the theoretical
framework of their discipline. This caution may be wise because only those
techniques that can be understood through reference to established conceptual schema may be endorsed with confidence. This principal may be
illustrated by the common problem of verification of computer programs.
When a program is presented as a "black box," without any explanatory
material, verification that the program will perform as intended is
problematic. If the program structure is unknown, then regardless of how
many different input patterns are presented in testing, one cannot be certain
of the program's perfornance on hitherto untested patterns. In fact, one
cannot even be confident that the program will perform as it previously
has on identical input. 31 In contrast, when the program is documented,
that is, presented with detailed step-by-step explanatory material, a human
may verify the program through inspection of its component parts. Once
the operation of each part becomes intuitively clear, the characteristics of the
entire program are thereby illuminated. Its performance may then be predicted with reasonable certainty for various classes of input.
It is important to note, however, that verification by documentation,
which corresponds to verification by theoretical explanation, is never absolutely
certain. The human attempting the verification may suffer from error and
delusion. Furthermore, the size of the steps that must be explained by documentation may vary depending on the nature of the program and the
identity of the human to which the documentation is addressed. In this
sense, there is no standard of absolute documentation; rather, the test is
whether the explanation is sufficient. Similarly, a procedure such as polygraphy
could be more confidently endorsed if each step in its operation were explainable. Again, however, there is no absolute standard to determine when
such a theoretical explanation is sufficient. It should be noted that many
unverified programs and unexplained procedures are nevertheless useful,
because confidence in them has developed through continued use.
Polygraphy is not readily subject to explanation. According to most
psychologists, no theory of polygraphy has yet revealed it as a synthesis of
theoretically acceptable components.3 2 The explanations seen in courts
typically describe a series of events, but these events are not intuitively correct
in themselves. For example, one source explains that "the act of lying causes
conscious conflict in the mind of the examinee, which produces an emotion
30. See note 60 infra.
31. This is because one cannot be certain that the program does not change with
time, so long as its structure remains invisible. See J. TAN, 1 SOFrWARE ENGINEERIMNG 76-92
(1972).
32. See Skolnick, supra note 7.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 5
1977]

POLYGRAPHY: SHORT CIRCUIT TO TRUTH?

of fear or anxiety, manifested by fluctuations in pulse rate, blood pressure,
breathing, and respiration."3 3 Here the connection between conflict and changes
in blood pressure is left unexplained; reference to an intermediate state of
"emotion" does not clarify the relationship.3 4 Thus, one commentator has
remarked, "academic psychology and psychophysiology challenge both substantive assumptions underlying lie-detection theory: the assumption of a
regular relationship between lying and emotional states, and the assumption
of a regular and measurable relationship between emotional change and
autonomic activity."35
The connections are not explained on the theory that all mental events
must have physical correlates.36 As acceptable as this may seem, it fails to
explain why a predictable connection should exist between deception and
response regardless of the subject matter in which the deception is embedded.
One's reaction to his deceptive statement that he was not at the scene of
the robbery might well bear no discernible similarity to the reaction to his
deceptive statement that he did not kill his wife. The different physical
reaction theoretically engendered by the mental action of thinking about
the scene of the robbery may be entirely dissimilar to that engendered by
thinking about killing one's wife, and the fact that both are deceptive does
not mean that the deception will be generalized and thus detectable. A polygraph examiner may claim that it is detectable, but no theory has yet
accounted for this.
It is not surprising that a technique involving human consciousness should
be less than theoretically sufficient. The court in United States v. Wilsonechoed this sentiment:
The Court may take judicial notice that the physical sciences exceed
the social sciences . . . in terms of experimental qualification and
verifiability. Indeed, the uniqueness of the human psyche still provokes debate as to whether the study of human behavior can approach
scientific standards as understood in the physical disciplines.33
Indeed, it is arguable that lack of theoretical sufficiency should not close
the door on a technique that may have some judicial usefulness. Although
courts should not admit techniques that the community might view as unfair
or illegitimate, legitimacy in this context does not require the theoretical
precision of the physical sciences. Notably, the function of juries in evaluat33. Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 478 (Alas. 1970).
34. None of the standard explanations offers an improvement. Compare this account
by a Federal district court: "A lie is an emergency to the psychological well-being of a
person and causes stress. Attempts to receive cause the sympathetic branch of the autonomic
nervous system to react and cause bodily changes of such a magnitude that they can
be measured and interpreted." United States v. Ridding, 350 F. Supp. 90, 92 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
35. Skolnick, supra note 7, at 703.
36. For a complete treatment of this notion in modern philosophical thought, see
W. WINDELBAND, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: RENAISSANCE, ENLIGITMENT, MODERN. §§31, 44
(1958); G. LANGFORD, HUMAN AcTION 26-29 (1971).
37. 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973).
38. Id. at 513-14.
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ing testimony falls short of this ideal. If polygraphy cannot approach
complete theoretical sufficiency - and in the 50 years since Frye there is little
indication that it can - then perhaps courts should be satisfied with the less
rigorous explanations offered by the social sciences or by polygraphy practitioners and treat polygraphy as an unverified but nevertheless useful procedure for detecting deception.3 9
The Courts' Dilemma
No uniform standard of how scientific acceptance is to be measured has
emerged. One court indicated that "surveys of the opinions of experts familiar
with polygraphs as to their usefulness in detection of deception"4 would be
persuasive. Few such surveys are available, and none are conclusive.41 Otherwise, the court must consult one expert to determine what others in his
field believe. Of course, the contents of the testimony will depend upon who
42
is consulted, so a "battle of the experts" may result.
Regardless of its decision over membership of the scientific community
and the technique for measuring acceptance, use of the general acceptance
standard may place courts in an uncomfortable position. Especially when a
technique is old enough to have been thoroughly examined by both the
scientific community and the courts, deferral to the former seems to serve
little purpose other than preventing a sound judicial consideration of the
admissibility of polygraphic evidence.
McCormick has argued- that general acceptance should be required only
when judicial notice is required. The theory is that general acceptance is
too restrictive a standard and that the added certainty it contributes is
necessary only when courts wish to recognize the essential validity of the
technique in any circumstance. Unless judicial notice is taken, individual
trials are forced to relitigate the substantial issues behind the basic or
overall validity of polygraphy. As one district court noted recently, "the
administration of justice simply cannot tolerate the burden of litigation
44
inherently involved in such a process."

39. A practitioner may explain polygraphy in terms that do not have precise
meanings. Nevertheless, the object of his explanation is not proof (he is satisfied the
technique works) but communication. One school of scientific thought postulates that
all theoretical explanations are mere attempts at communication, and that no standards
for proof can be set beyond what the party to whom the communication is directed will
accept. This means that the adequacy is an advocate's proof of polygraphy, i.e., his
assertion of its theoretical sufficiency depends upon whom he is trying to convince. Thus,
if the public must be convinced of the value of polygraphy, a mere communicative
explanation from a practitioner might suffice. See generally, HOBSON, THE DOMAIN OF
NATURAL SCIENCE 24-54 (1926).
40. Pulakis v. State, 472 P.2d 474, 479 (Alas. 1970).
41. The only reported survey of the scientific community on the subject of polygraphy is Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L.
REv. 728 (1953). No consensus was discovered.
42. See United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
43. C. McCoRICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §203, at 489 (2d ed. 1973).
44. United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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If the general acceptance standard is eliminated, the court must face the
considerable task of evaluating the admissibility of polygraphic evidence on
its own.
THE

RELEVANCY STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Evidence make no specific provision for polygraphic
evidence; nor do they prescribe a "general acceptance" test for scientific or
experimental evidence. Rather, they provide an evidentiary standard of wide
applicability, derived from the nucleic concept of relevancy:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
45
the evidence.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution . . . by act of Congress [or] by these rules ....
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.Professor McCormick agrees that the standard for acceptance of polygraphic
evidence should not differ from that of other evidence.47 Although the
relevancy standard has expressly permitted acceptance of polygraphic evidence
in only one state decision, 48 on occasion courts have indicated implicit agreement with the test prescribed. 49
The threshold test of relevancy is whether the evidence offered alters
the probability of a material fact. There is no definite amount by which
the probability must be altered; evidence is relevant if it displays "any
tendency" to render a fact "more, probable or less probable.""5 Arguably
then, any procedure offering an improvement over mere chance or randomness
would meet this requirement. According to even the most conservative
estimates 51 of accuracy, polygraphy appears to offer such an improvement

45.

FED. R. Evrn. 401.

Relevancy

in the Federal Rules is thus akin to "logical

relevance." Some sources use relevancy to mean logical relevance discounted by the
probability of prejudice or other factors ("legal relevance'). In this usage, relevant evidence
is at once admissible, the inquiry into prejudice having already been completed. When used
in this note, relevance means simply "logical relevance" as described in the Rules.
46. FED. R. Evm. 402.
47. C. McCoRMicK, supra note 43. The standard advocated by McCormick is relevancy
discounted by the probability of prejudice, confusion, and waste of judicial time. Id. See
also Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 ILL. LJ. 1

(1970); Boyd, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L.
REv. 313 (1962).
48. State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 328, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App.), af'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539
P.2d 204 (1975).
49. "[No] prejudice to the government can flow from allowing the defendant the
opportunity to at least attempt to lay a foundation for the admissibility of polygraphic
evidence at trial." United States v. Oliver, 492 F.2d 943, 944 n.1 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Wainwright, 413 F2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969) (defendant unsuccessful).
50. FED. R. EVID. 402.

51. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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over chance, 52 and this may be a compelling argument for its admission. 53
The relevancy standard will present courts with complexities which transcend
the question of an overall estimate of accuracy.
Reliability:Accuracy in a ParticularCase
Courts do not decide hypothetical cases; they are faced with a particular
defendant and a particular polygraph test. General estimates of accuracy may
not be persuasive unless reliability - the survival of accuracy in a particular
case - can be established. In polygraphy, physical and psychological conditions in the subject and inexpertise in the examiner may reduce the procedure's accuracy far below the normally quoted figures. For example, the
following factors may degrade accuracy if present in a particular exam:
(1) improper test conditions:5 4 uncomfortable room temperature or instrument discomfort; (2) medical problems:5 5 abnormal blood pressure, obesity or
heart or respiratory irregularities; (3) mental abnormality: incompetence,56
psychopathy5 7 or schizophrenia; (4) temporary physical difficulties: fatigue 5
or intoxication5 9 (5) unusual mental states: lack of concern over detection, 0
52. But see text accompanying note 28 supra.
53. See State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
54. Improper test conditions may cause unpredictable results. In particular, if the
subject is experiencing discomfort either because of abnormally low room temperature or
binding of the cardiograph or pneumograph units at their attachments, readings may
display rises in blood pressure characteristic of deception. Sensitivity of the operator to
the test conditions is required. See J. REID, supra, note 1, at 176.
55. Extremes in blood pressure, obesity, and malformation of the limbs may preclude a test by making attachment of the instruments ineffective or uncomfortable. Heart
or respiratory irregularities should be distinguishable from deception responses by a skilled
examiner. With the exception of the Larson school, however, examiners undergo little or
no medical training. Id. at 184.
56. Because they are unable to comprehend the questions, mental incompetents and
infants are unsuitable subjects. Id. at 196.
57. The "criminal psychopath," able to lie with utter impunity, may indeed fool a
jury or a polygraph. But Reid reports that the incidence of such is far less than
popular fancy would believe. Id. at 199.
58. Fatigue, or "adrenal shock" as may be brought on by extended questioning is
widely cited as causing poor results. See, e.g., United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp.
1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 279, 371 P.2d 894, 899 (1962). This
condition should only produce a "false negative" reading that is, a diagnosis of truth
when in fact there is deception. In addition, an operator should detect extreme fatigue
through visual examination. J. REID, supra note 1, at 202.
59. Both alcohol and drugs may inhibit response, causing false negative errors. The
problem is less serious for subjects in custody, as access to intoxicants will be reduced.
Id. 60. "A subject's concern over the possibility of detection appears to be the principal
factor accounting for the physiological changes that are recorded and interpreted as
symptoms of detection." Id. at 168. To be concerned over detection, a subject must
believe that the polygraph will successfully reveal his deception, and he must have a
stake in concealing his deception. To cultivate the former, examiners will refer continually
to the infallibility of the machine, and will attempt to demonstrate its infallibility through
a "card test" prior to the interview. In the test, the subject selects a card at random
and supposedly without the knowledge of the examiner. The examiner purports to
determine which card the subject selected through polygraphic analysis of the subject's
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rationalization or self-deceit,"' yoga-like abstraction6 2 conjuring false images,
or extreme nervousness; 63 (6) intentional efforts to avoid detection:- controlled breathing, hidden muscular contractions, or self-inflicted pain.
The examiner's failure to detect any such abnormality materially increases
the chance of error. Thus no court should accept proffered polygraphic
evidence without detailed information on the conditions surrounding the
particular subject, examiner, and test setting.65
Accuracy: Polygraph vs. Jury
Since the Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as that
tending to make a material fact "more probable . . . than it would be
without the evidence," 66 it is necessary to consider the situation "without
the evidence." Without polygraphic evidence, the trier of fact will evaluate,
unassisted, the credibility of the witnesses. The judge or the jury has long
been entrusted with this type of determination of fact or credibility. 67 This
does not mean that the jury system is the most desirable or accurate system
possible; the system arose when no polygraphs were available.68 Unfortunately,
it has been very difficult to determine how accurate the jury system is, either
responses. The test, however, is bogus: the examiner knows of the card and the responses
may not have identified the card at all. J. REID, supra note 1 at 27 n.36. The subject's
concern over detection arguably might not be sustained if he knows that the results
of the test cannot be used as evidence. See United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp.

1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
61. "Rationalization or self-deceit might produce an indefinite result but not an
erroneous one." J. REID, supra note 1, at 179. The ability to rationalize or self-deceive
and thus avoid detection is widely believed to be ingrained in man, and an expression
of his apparent freedom. See generally W. WINDELBAND, supra note 36, §§40, 44; J. SARTRE,
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (1964). This may be the origin of the popular notion that
one can always "beat the machine."
62. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973).
63. Whereas concern over detection is good, extreme nervousness can overwhelm the
characteristic deceptive responses and give indefinite results. Whether it can result in a
false positive error is not agreed upon. Nervousness can result from pre-existing psychoneuroses, from guilt in previous crimes, or from the questioning process itself. A subject who
is interrogated as though he is already responsible for the offense in question is no
longer a suitable subject for a polygraph test by that examiner. J. REID, supra note 1 at 12.
64. Intentional efforts to avoid detection can effectively mask responses. However,
the efforts themselves may be viewed as indicative of deception. Id. at 153-68. See also
text accompanying notes 109-13, infra.
65. See, e.g., State v. Curtis, 281 So. 2d 514, 515 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973) ("reliability ...
is still dependent upon too large a number of variable factors impossible of resolution.').
66.
ED. R. Evnw. 401.
67. See, e.g., Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 P. 419 (1896). (Evaluating truth is a
process "of enormous complexity, and involves an almost infinite number of variable
factors. It is the basic premise of the jury system that twelve men and women can
harmonize those variables and decide, with the aid of examination and cross-examination,
the truthfulness of a witness."); United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959).
68. Trial by ordeal may be considered an early form of instrumental detection of
deception. See generally W. BMSON, ANCIENT MODFS OF TRIAL 266-74 (1947); H. GorrEIN,
PRuMrrivE ORDEAL AND MODERN L W 56-57 (1923).
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in making factual determinations or in evaluating credibility. Thus, it remains a matter of conjecture whether the polygraph can offer an improvement.6 9
The jury, however, performs a normalizing function beyond its role as
factfinder. The judgment of one's peers is an element of our judicial system
that should not lightly be discarded. To this degree, speculation on improvements in accuracy resulting from replacement of the jury by a polygraph is
unproductive. Even the most vocal advocates of polygraphy do not propose
complete abrogation of the jury in favor of the machine, but see the machine
as assisting the trier of fact. The principal objection to such use of the
polygraph is not that it is insufficiently accurate, and thus not relevant, but
70
that it is overly prejudicial and disruptive of the jury system.
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF POLYGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

Even if scientifically accepted or demonstrably accurate, evidence that
is prejudicial to the trier of fact must be excluded. The Federal Rules of
Evidence provide, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju1
dice . ...
69. Investigation is needed into whether the efficacy of juries in detecting deception
is related to any sense of guilt or moral shame, heightened by the oath, felt by the
witness upon lying. Certainly, physiological reactions to deception are not innate to the
species, but are the products of cultural conditioning. If conditioning in modern culture
has de-emphasized the role of ethical guilt, perhaps people now are better liars. Whether
the polygraph is equally hampered by this "new morality" is a topic of some conjecture.
70. FED. R. EvID. 403.
71. Generally, scientific evidence may determine an ultimate conclusion. FED. R. EvID.
704 provides: "Testimony . . . otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
A basic problem involves the defendant accused of murder who, taking a polygraph
test, registers a deceptive response to the question of whether he committed the murder.
If the court were to admit the polygraphic evidence, would it be proper for the jury
to consider the evidence as determinative of his guilt, or merely as demonstrating, in an
impeaching context, that he had previously lied (in both cases, subject to the belief
in the testimony)? Note that, as the polygraph measures consciousness of deception, the
defendant would have registered a deceptive response if he mistakenly believed he had
committed the murder. This is not to say that the inference the jury might draw
that his belief in his guilt is incriminating in itself is incorrect. If the defendant had
confessed in open court on the strength of his mistaken belief, the jury could hardly
be expected not to treat this as determinative of guilt. There is a difference, however,
between an open confession and the pronouncement of a polygraph operator that the
defendant is guilty. The jury may weigh the probability that the confession is mistaken
against other evidence that may be available; however, with polygraph results, the jury
may feel that the machine is somehow definitive on the issue of guilt and not realize
the effect of a potential mistake. See State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900-01
(1962) ("[T]he trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does
not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is
charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination defendant
was not telling the truth.").
Occasionally, conflicting testimony is the only evidence available, and in these situations, polygraphic evidence, if admissible, could properly determine ultimate guilt, although
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Undue Weight and Scope
There are several prejudicial factors inherent in polygraphic evidence.
First, a jury may treat the evidence as determinative of the ultimate issue
at trial. This difficulty may be surmountable by instruction. Second, a jury
may be inclined to assign greater than proper weight to polygraphic evidence.
In rejecting proferred polygraphic evidence the Massachusetts supreme court
viewed with alarm "[a]n almost impenetrable aura of scientific infallibility
72
[surrounding] the polygraph machine . . . in the minds of the jurors."
It is inevitable, and not necessarily prejudicial, that jurors will accept the
products of modern industrial technology without understanding the details
of each item's operation. However, it would be prejudicial for jurors to
accept polygraphy as such a product if the polygrapher's conclusion is more
a result of his expertise at evaluation than of scientific advances built into
his instrument. If the examiner's participation is substantial - especially
in discretionary and not merely ministerial functions - then the jury is
entitled to give some weight to his conclusions; but if the jury believes the
conclusion was reached through advanced and inscrutable technology, then
the weight they assign is apt to be undue, and therefore prejudicial. For
this reason it is important to consider the role of the polygraph examiner.
Role of the Examiner
(1) Reading of the
graphy - interpretation
ment of the examiner
examiner is tested in

instrument. Even in the most concrete area of polyof the pen movements of the instrument - the judgis critical. For example, the discrimination of the
the following problems:

(1) Threshold: how much pen movement indicates deception?7s
(2) Timing: to what question should a significant pen movement be
related?74

the conclusion of guilt must be drawn by the jury and not by the examiner. Thus

in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), polygraphic evidence
was accepted as determinative of defendant's ultimate guilt of perjury. See also Walther
v. O'Connel, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Queens Cty. Ct. 1972) (polygraphic
evidence to resolve diametrically opposed testimony on a loan).
72. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
Mass.
, 313 N.E.2d 120, 135 (1974).
73. For instance, the respiratory responses characteristc of deception are (1) respiratory suppression, (2) baseline rise, and (3)cycle change. But all are continuous measurements, and no cutoff figure is specified in polygraph manuals. The examiner must decide
how much change indicates deception. See generally R. LEE, THE INSTRUMENTAL DETECTION
OF DECEPTION (1953).
74. Relating a response to a specific interview question is a complex task. Physiological

responses may precede a question, because often the same question is repeated on successive
tests. Or, responses may follow a question for some time, if the subject continues to
think about his answer. Anticipatory responses, especially those which precede a question
an interval greater than one respiratory cycle are not indicative of deception, whereas
lingering responses are diagnostic of deception from the source question. In a short
interview, laced with threatening questions, singling out anticipatory and lingering responses
may be unmanageable. See J. REiD, supra note 1, at 40-53.
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Correlation: what if pens tracing different physiological measure75
ments give contrary implications?
Idiosyncracy: how do differences in subjects affect results?- 6

The interpretation problems are compounded when a subject attempts to
trick the machine.Y7 Anomalous results may follow unless an examiner is
able to detect the evasive behavior at an early stage.
Also, the unconscious bias introduced into all instrument readings, known
as the "halo effect,""' 5 is well known. When an examiner has a particular
result in mind, he is apt to err towards the side of the desired result even
in the simplest and most mechanical of tasks. "Double-blind" experiments,
where the examiner is ignorant of the consequences of an instrumental reading,
are employed to minimize halo effect. But in polygraphy, the examiner
must interpret the response as deceptive or otherwise and so cannot be blind
to the consequences. Thus, the possibility of a halo effect is ever-present.
(2) Delivey of Questions. In the formation and delivery of questions
to the subject, the skill of the examiner directly determines the success of
the test. Control questions, delivered at the outset of the interview to
establish baseline responses, must be continually modified in light of the
earlier responses."9 Failure to establish a reliable baseline immediately invalidates the test. Interview questions, delivered at a proper pace to maintain
peak reactivity, 8° must relate to the fact situation under investigation,
75. The Reid polygraph displays four physiological parameters, and all others currently
in use display at least three. If all parameters correlated perfectly, measurement of more
than one would be superfluous. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An
Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 703 (1961). Examiners may not agree on which
variables are the most significant. Larson regarded systolic blood pressure as the best single
indicator. J. LXJSON, supra note 1. Reid believed respiratory "experimenters generally
regard galvanic skin response as the best indicator of deception, but field examiners
generally do not; possible galvanic skin response is the only indicator sensitive enough
for laboratory experiments on subjects who do not care much whether they succeed
in deceiving the experimenter, but is too sensitive for the intensely emotional circumstances
of real life interrogations." Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 478 n.19 (Alas. 1970), citing
Thackray & Orne, A Comparison of Physiological Indices In Detection of Deception,
4 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 329 (1968).
76. Individuals display unique responses to deception with respect to magnitude,
pattern, timing, and correlation. The control questions theoretically serve to calibrate the
instrument, but are often inadequate for the task, as they may fail to bring about
the full emotional content of the later questioning. See United States v. Urquidez, 356
F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
77. See text accompanying notes 88-90, infra.
78. See Skolnick, supra note 75, at 712.
79. For example, the examiner must induce the subject to lie about something, so
that the pattern for lying in this particular subject can be ascertained. He must ask a
question to which he knows the answer but feels the subject will answer deceptively. And
it would do no good to ask the subject to give a purposely deceptive response,
because then the subject would be unconcerned over the possibility of detection. A
common question asks whether the subject has ever stolen anything. Most subjects have
and will not admit it. But a particular subject may have not, and another control question
must be asked if no response occurs. J. REID, supra note 1,at 52, 125-26.
80. The separate questions must be short and direct; long-winded questions tend to
dissipate the emotional tension. Id. at 180.
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and must avoid ambiguity or the need for the subject's interpretation.s If
the examiner fails to maintain an inflection that is suitably formal but not2
overly accusatorial, the value of the subject's responses will be diminished.
(3) Use of outwardly incriminating signs. Far from being trained to
ignore the subject's demeanor, or "outward signs of deception," the polygraph examiner is encouraged to use them for "ultimate diagnostic
purposes."8' 3 Mr. Reid suggests that "a lying subject usually will not display...
frankness or interest; he is rather prone to speak evasively in generalities
about the matter in question."- When questioned about the perpetrators of
a crime, "a truthful subject who harbors any suspicions will name the persons
or person he suspects; the untruthful subject will seldom identify another
person as a suspect." s5 Remarkably, even the subject's respiratory condition
may be incriminating, according to Reid; the examiner is exhorted to "[pay]
particular attention . . . to the matter of whether or not [the subject] is

coughing or sniffing .... ,, Not only the examiner but also his employees
may evaluate these outward symptoms. Reid states that "the recorded ob-

81. The problem of appropriate questions is compounded by the fact that most
examiners have little opportunity to become intimately familiar with the factual situation surrounding an event in question. The interview questions must be of a factual
nature exclusively; interpretation, analysis or conclusion of the subject will degrade
response. In United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1972), though the examiner,
Reid, was a highly experienced operator, the court would not admit evidence of a polygraph test principally because the test questions were ambiguous and unrevealing. Reid
had asked, "Did you give money to . . . for the operation of illegal gambling activities?"
356 F. Supp. at 31. The question and the response were worthless as indicators of deception
because the question required the subject to define "illegal gambling activities." Since
the issue related to the validity of the evidence, not just its weight, the court and
not the jury examined the questions for sufficiency. Likewise, in Butler v. State, 228
So. 2d 421 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969) the court, not the jury, examined the test questions
and found them adequately revealing.
82. The examiner must adjust the psychological atmosphere of the interrogation room
for optimum response. Although he should foster concern over detection, see note 60,
supra, he should avoid extreme nervousness, see note 68, supra. The questions asked
during a polygraph test become part of the record that a court may evaluate in considering the sufficiency of the test. But the psychological atmosphere cannot be recorded;
bias introduced by inflection or gesture is thus generally undetectable.
83. "The justification for ultimate diagnostic purposes of taking into account
outward symptoms of truth or deception is closely related to the procedure used by a
physician in his attempted diagnosis of illness or health. He, too, takes into account the
observable symptoms disclosed by the patient's outward appearance and verbalizations."

J. REm, supra note 1, at 16.
84. Id. at 13. "Many times he will, in contrast to the truth-telling subject, squirm
around in the chair, look away from the examiner, cross his legs, use his hands as
though trying to dust something off his clothes, or engage in some other similar physical
activity." Id.
85. Id. Furthermore, "[a] truth-telling subject wil usually make a strong denial that
he was anywhere around at the time of the crime, barring, of course, a situation where
his presence there was innocently explainable. A lying subject, on the other hand, will
usually stall with his answer, indulge in bodily movements such as squirming around
and then finally deny being present at the scene." Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 15. Note that then expressions are usually unrecorded.
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servations of a secretary or receptionist as to the subject's general conduct
87
or behavior while in the waiting room will be very helpful to the examiner."
(4) Response to uncooperative subject. Especially because these outward
signs of deception may be highly subjective in nature, the possibility of
any aberration from unconscious bias to intentional misconduct cannot be
overlooked."" Particularly revealing is the diagnosis of an uncooperative subject. According to Reid, subjects who intentionally attempt to deceive the
machine "fail to realize ... that their evasive conduct itself is just as significant
of their deception as the responses that are revealed in the tracings of
8' 9
lying subjects who do not seek to evade detection by that process." Thus,
an examiner's testimony that a response is deceptive might merely reflect a
belief that the subject was uncooperative. However, a subject may legitimately
refuse to cooperate. He may feel that the test will not adequately reveal
his innocence. If he feels the test will reveal his guilt, he may invoke his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination.90 Neither case should be treated
as "just as significant" of deception as classic instrumental deception patterns.
An examiner's diagnosis of an uncooperative subject may sometimes be
nothing more than a thoroughly prejudicial interpretation of his conduct.
Because of the unusual responsibility of the examiner in polygraphy,

87. Id. at 10.
88. See United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (concern over
the integrity of the operator); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Md. 1973)
("Tihe preparation of the test and discussion with the examinee of the polygraph procedure
furnish additional opportunity for improper subjective evaluation . . . . The acquainting
of the examiner with tise subject matter is often a source of improper suggestion, conscious
or subconscious.").
89. J. REID, supra note 1, at 153 (emphasis added).
90. Polygraphic evidence is testimonial and not merely physical, so unlike the bodily
extractions in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), under the fifth amendment,
it cannot be secured from an unwilling subject. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F.
Supp. 1377, 1389 (S.D. Cal. 1972) and authorities cited therein.
The usual reasons for holding the evidence testimonial, even though it consists
principally of a physical measurement, but see text accompanying notes 83-88 supra, is that
a verbal response engenders and makes meaningful the physical reaction. Some sub-tests
do not employ answers at all. In the "peak of tension" test, an examiner displays to a
subject a number of articles, some of which may have incriminating value, and records the
subject's reactions to merely viewing the articles. See J. REID, supra note 1, at 127-30.
Perhaps in all tests the subject responds to an incriminating question, regardless of whether
his answer is verbal. If this is the case, polygraphy may be viewed as a bodily extraction
and not a form of testimony.
Under the theory that it is testimonial, polygraphic evidence can be secured constitutionally only from a subject who has waived his fifth amendment privilege. Usually, consent
to take the test amounts to a waiver. 348 F. Supp. at 1389. This comports with the
generally accepted notion that polygraph tests on unwilling subjects are impossible. See
J. REID, supra note 1, at 5. However, if a subject does consent to take a test and during
the test becomes uncooperative, it is uncertain whether he has thereby revoked his consent.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although it may appear that he has, an
examiner may treat lack of cooperation as deception and so testify. See, e.g., Walther v.
O'Connel, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 317, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (Queens Cty. Ct. 1972) ("purposefully
uncooperative subject").
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several states now require licensing of "detectors of deception" in order to
provide standards of training and character. 91 The standards are rather
lenient, however, and lack national uniformity, despite attempts by national
92
polygraphers' associations to promote standardization of the profession.
Notwithstanding such licensing, Professor Inbau has testified that only 20%
of all polygraph examiners are truly qualified. 93
Recognizing the importance of the examiner's role, courts invariably
hold that if circumstances otherwise permit introduction of polygraphic
evidence, the examiner who performed the test must testify in person at
trial.- The theory is that vigorous cross-examination may expose the biases
or at least the vagueries implicit in the test, and will demonstrate the
extreme dependence of the test on a competent and fair examiner. Unsatisfied with this, Other courts have insisted that any polygraph test, to be
admissible, must be performed by court appointed experts. 95 Still other
courts view the examiner responsibility problem as insurmountable and the
primary obstacle to the judicial use of polygraphic evidence. 96

91. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §493 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§202-1 to 202-30 (1973);
Tax Rrv. Civ. STATS. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) §7 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§54-729.01-.018
Mass.
(Supp. 1973). For a more complete list, see Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
, 313 N.E.2d 120, 135 (1974).
92. FLA. STAT. §493.43 (1975) requires the following qualifications for a detection of
deception examiner: (1) minimum age of 21; (2) United States citizen; (3) established
integrity; (4) no felony conviction; (5) bachelor's degree or five years experience; (6) six
weeks training at recognized school; (7) one year as intern.
93. Use of Polygraphs as Lie Detectors by the Federal Government, Hearings Before
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong. 2d
Sess. Pts. 1-5 (1968) (testimony of F. Inbau). Inbau has also stated, "it is argued that
the margin of error . . . is small. That might be true where tests were made by recognized
experts, but it is not safe to say that such would be the case if every police department
in the country should send one or two officers to a training institute for 30 days and
then proclaim them to be experts." State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 235,
237 (Ct. App. 1963).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972) (jury will be
able to make adequate evaluation with the help of cross-examination); United States v.
DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 281-83, 371
P.2d 894, 899-901 (1962) (standards for the admission of polygraphic evidence upon stipulation require the presence of the examiner at trial); Carpenter v. State, 241 N.E.2d 347 (Ind.
1968) (trial court's consideration of polygraph test results in letter without testimony
of examiner was prejudicial error).
95. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Ridling approved the
use of polygraphic evidence without stipulation provided the examiners be appointed by
the court. See FED. R. Evm. 706, stating that a court may on its own motion appoint
expert witnesses.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973); United
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (C.D. Md. 1973) ("polygraph, albeit based on a
scientific theory, remains an art with unusual responsibility placed on the examiner .... "
Id. at 512. The court commented on the lack of consensus among experts.); State v. Hill,
40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 19-20, 317 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Ct. App. 1963) ("polygraphy is only
as reliable and valuable as the examiner. It must be remembered that there are few
truly competent examiners . . .').
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Role of the Jury
Measures should be taken to minimize prejudice if polygraphic evidence
is to be admitted. The jury should be informed that polygraphy is not an
exact science and, regardless of what accuracy figures may be introduced, is
never infallible. Jury instructions should specify that any polygraphic evidence
admitted is mere expert opinion to be weighed along with all the other
evidence presented.9 7 The court should warn polygraph examiners that they
are not to opine on the issue of ultimate guilt. Further, it may adopt the
position that polygraphic evidence, as relevant only to past deception or
truthfulness of the witness, may be used only for impeachment purposes.98
Abrogation of the Jury
A good deal of concern has been expressed about the prejudice that
might result from the jury, awed by a scientific mystique, giving undue
weight to polygraphic evidence. If the evidence is presented as expert opinion,
much of this prejudicial effect may be removed. However, if the polygraph
test is understood as merely an expert evaluation, without any instrumental
aid, it might still be inadmissible. In Salem v. United States Lines Co.,99 the
Supreme Court excluded expert testimony about whether a particular fixture
on a ship was dangerous on the theory that the determination of what was
dangerous was an area wholly within the jury's understanding and discretion:
The general rule is . . . expert testimony not only is unnecessary but
indeed may properly be excluded . . . if all the primary facts can be

accurately and intelligently described to the jury, and if they, as men
of common understanding, are as capable of comprehending the
primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them as are
[expert] witnesses. ....

100

Thus, a polygraph examiner, if he employs only the same primary facts
(here, the outward signs of deception) that are accessible to the jury, cannot
properly offer his expert opinion. One reason for excluding the expert
testimony here is that it is apt to offer no improvement in accuracy. Also,
regardless of the accuracy of the expert, it is improper to replace the jury
in making the types of evaluation with which it had previously been en-

97. Scientific evidence is not usually restricted to the form of expert opinion. FED.
R. Evm. 702 provides: "[A] witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify . . . in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." According to the Advisory Committee, "it seems
wise . . . to encourage the use of expert testimony in nonopinion form when counsel
believes the trier can itself draw the requisite inference." FED. R. Evil. 702 (Notes of
Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules). The court, however, would be unable to interpret
raw polygraph data because this can be done only by a skilled examiner. Thus the
use of his expert testimony should be in opinion form only.
98. For a discussion of the propriety of allowing polygraphic evidence to be determinative of guilt, see note 71 supra.
99.

370 U.S. 31 (1962).

100. Id. at 85.
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trusted. Thus, in United States v. Amaral,101 the court of appeals excluded
the expert opinion of a psychologist estimating the reliability of certain
eyewitness identification. The court emphasized that the expert should not
02
Although
be permitted to substitute his judgment for that of the jury.1
03
failed to carefully
both the Amaral court and a similar Florida decision
separate the issue of relevance from that of prejudice, these decisions indicate
that testimony from a "lie expert" who has interviewed subjects and used
the same outward signs of deception that the jury presumably uses, is likely
to be excluded, regardless of whether the expert was arguably more accurate
than the average jury.
Polygraphy purports to measure, through instrumental means, signs of
deception that are inaccessible to the jury. The machine and the method
employed distinguish the polygraph examiner from the "lie expert" above.
However, in view of the extensive role of the examiner in interacting with
the machine, and the fact that the outward signs of deception visible to the
jury may also be included in the examiner's diagnosis, this distinction may
be insignificant. Furthermore, just what constitute the "outward signs of
deception" that presumably are visible to a jury are not specifically known.
The nature and magnitude of possible physiological changes have not been
catalogued. It is thus premature to conclude, absent a showing that polygraphy is demonstrably superior to a jury in detecting deception,104 that a
polygraph does anything more than measure numerically what humans have
been measuring, consciously or unconsciously, all along. 0 5

101. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
102. Accord, Campbell v. Clark, 283 F.2d 766, 768 (10th Cir. 1958) ("Expert testimony . . . is inadmissible in instances where the normal experience and qualifications
of laymen jurors enable them to draw proper conclusions."); Grayson v. Williams, 256
F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958); Farris v. Interstate Circuit, 116 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1941);
but cf. Jones v. Goodlove, 334 F.2d 90, 94 (8th Cir. 1964), where the court, upon
admitting expert testimony relating skid marks at an accident scene to negligent vehicle
speed, maintained that "expert testimony is not vulnerable to an objection that it invades
the province of the jury." 334 F.2d at 94. The exact relationship between skid marks
and speed might well be outside the normal experience of the jury, however, so the
quoted passage seems merely dictum.
FED. R. Evm. 702 provides that expert testimony is admissible "if scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
Unfortunately, the rule does not distinguish between
to determine a fact in issue ......
the irrelevant and the prejudicial, but rather appears to offer a third standard for
scientific evidence embodying both relevancy and prejudice.
103. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d 311 (4th D.C.A. 1971), cert.
denied, 270 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1972).
104. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
105. "As a scientific instrument, however, all that can be legitimately claimed for
the polygraph is that through physiological responses it may provide clues to veracity
that are more detailed than those afforded by visual observation of the subject in an
interview. Nevertheless there is strong reason to doubt that these autonomic response data
are any more precise in terms of permitting a systematic and reliable inference of lying."
Skolnick, supra note 75, at 714.
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QUALIFIED ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

Though the courts' overwhelming posture is one of inadmissibility, under
compelling circumstances some courts have felt obliged to admit polygraphic
evidence in some form. Qualified admissions have occurred in the contexts
of (1) due process compulsions to admit exonerating evidence; (2) stipulation
agreements between adversaries; and (3) incriminating responses or confessions to polygraph operators.
Due ProcessCompulsion to Admit
When a polygraph test indicates that a prosecutorial witness is untruthful, a defendant would naturally wish to present evidence of the test
to the jury for purposes of impeachment. The court in United States v.
Hart'0 6 allowed such evidence, viewing admissibility as "not a pure question
of the reliability of polygraph tests," 10 7 but as a question of prosecutorial duty
under the dictates of due process.
Hart was based on Brady v. Maryland,18 in which the Supreme Court
approved a mistrial when the prosecution failed to disclose a confession
made by defendant's companion. The Brady court held, "the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process when the evidence is material . . . to guilt ... "109 Thus, Brady

imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
evidence, including that tending to prove perjury on the part of a prosecution witness."

0

Hart extended Brady significantly. While the confession suppressed in
Brady was otherwise judicially acceptable,"' the court in Hart was "bound
by the authorities . . . that polygraphic evidence is not admissible."'

2

To

surmount this posture of inadmissibility caused by distrust of the polygraph's
reliability, the court relied on an estoppel-like notion, "the results of the
tests which the government had the witness take are admissible on behalf
of the defendant because the government initially thought they were reliable enough to assist it in evaluating its witnesses."' 3 While Brady required
disclosure to the defendant under penalty of mistrial, Hart required no less
than disclosure to the jury: "Under the Brady principle, the burden should
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 523.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.

Due process is violated when a state "has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); see also Barbee
v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
111. 373 U.S. at 88, 94 n.4. However, the question of whether the confession was admissible as relevant to guilt or merely as relevant to punishment was unresolved. 373 U.S.
at 92-94 (Harlan & Black, JJ., dissenting).
112. 344 F. Supp. at 524.
113. Id.
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be on the government to convince a jury that this test was of no significance."' 4
So broad is the Hart rationale that it would seem to apply to the results
of an exonerating polygraph test taken by the defendant himself, provided
it is taken at the request of the prosecution so that the prosecution would be
estopped from objecting to reliability. A defendant under the Hart rule
would have nothing to lose and everything to gain from accepting the
prosecution's offer. Of course, a prosecutor would refrain from such offers
unless, under pressure of a large caseload, he wanted to eliminate unlikely
convictions.
The impact of Hart, however, has been less than overwhelming. In State
v. Dorsey,"15 the court, without citing Hart, relied upon a due process
requirement first articulated in Chambers v. Mississippi." "[W]here constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated,
the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice.""7 Chambers, like Brady, involved a due process compulsion to
admit a confederate's extrajudicial confession. But unlike that in Brady,
the Chambers confession was inadmissible under a state holding that refused
to recognize declarations against penal interest as exceptions to the hearsay
rule.1 8 Persuaded that the confession was otherwise reliable and that the
evidentiary rule was perhaps outdated, the Court in Chambers concluded
that "the exclusion of this critical evidence . . . denied [the defendant] a
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process." 9
There is a large step between overturning a highly technical and obsolete
evidentiary rule, as in Chambers, and removing all evidentiary bars, as
Dorsey seemed to require. Recently, a Florida court refused to take even a
smaller step to relax the hearsay rule and admit testimony of third-party
statements made to a police officer during an investigation. 20 Chambers was
readily distinguished as applying only when the evidence sought to be
admitted is of independently ascertainable reliability and the rule preventing
2
its admission has but a marginal relation to reliability.' '
In Dorsey, where the rule barring polygraphic evidence related directly
to the validity of the evidence, and no independent showing of reliability
was made, the relevance of Chambers is questionable.- 2 The case illustrates
114. Id. at 523.
115.

87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).

116.

410 U.S. 284 (1973).

117.

Id. at 302.

118. Declarations against interest are frequently admitted as exceptions to the hearsay
rule because of their inherent trustworthiness. W. RicHARsoN, RicHARD ON ON EvIDENCE
§255, at 224 (5th ed. 1973). Originally only declarations against pecuniary or proprietary
interest were recognized, but most states and the Federal Rules have now recognized
declarations against penal interests as well. Id. §260. The Federal Rules require that such
declarations be accompanied by "corroborating circumstances clearly indicat[ing] the trust-

worthiness of the statement." Fm. R. EvED. 804(b)(3).
119. 410 US. at 302.
120. Dykman v. State, 300 So. 2d 695 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974).
121. Id. at 699.
122. In a short affirmance, the New Mexico supreme court did not mention Chambers
but merely held that the evidentiary bar against polygraphic evidence is "inconsistent with
due process." State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975).
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the tension courts may feel between their desire to maintain high evidentiary
standards on one hand and their due process obligations to permit a
defendant access to important exculpatory evidence, even if it is polygraphic,
on the other.
Stipulation Agreements
Sometimes the parties to an action may agree that polygraphic evidence
should be introduced. On the force of this agreement, some courts will allow
evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible. An agreement could be
implied from a party's failure to object when such evidence is offered by
his adversary, although such occurrences are rare. 123 More commonly, a
previous agreement could be evidenced by a stipulation signed by both parties
prior to the polygraph test and providing for admission of the evidence
54
regardless of outcome.
Although earlier decisions dealt with the issue, 125 State v. Valdez12 6 re123. A defendant, even if ignorant of the test results, would reasonably assume that
the state would not offer exonerating evidence, and so would object immediately. Likewise,
the state would assume that no defendant would introduce incriminating evidence and
would similarly object. So lack of objection at trial, absent inadvertence or surprise,
would be a rare occurrence. Nonetheless, lack of objection at trial was held to be a
requirement for admission of polygraphic evidence in State v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 686, 526
P.2d 1091, 1093 (1974). Contra, State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct. App.
1975) ("It seems incongruous that an expert's testimony under an acceptable scientific test
shall be excluded because opposing counsel object."). See Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754
(Fla. 1975), where the court's language ("[lit is true that results of lie detector tests are
inadmissible over objections .... " Id. at 756) was inconsistent with its holding (affirmance
of the District Court of Appeal, which admitted polygraphic evidence pursuant to an
oral stipulation over the petitioner's objections. Id.).
124. "It has long been established that counsel may stipulate to evidence which may
be received even though it might otherwise be inadmissible." People v. Zavaleta, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 171, 182 Cal. App. 2d 422, 430 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); accord, Herman v. Eagle
Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 396 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1967).
125. In LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943), the first reported decision
on the matter, the court excluded polygraphic evidence favorable to the defendant even
though a written stipulation had been signed, on the prosecutor's objection that the
evidence was traditionally inadmissible. But in People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686,
193 P.2d 937 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948), the court admitted polygraphic evidence unfavorable to
to a defendant who had knowingly signed a stipulation agreement: "[i]t would be difficult to
hold that [he] should now be permitted on his appeal to take advantage of any claim
that [the] operator was not an expert and that as to the results of the test such
evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to indicate that he was not telling
the truth." 193 P.2d at 942. Accord, State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960)
(defendant's objection to unfavorable polygraphic evidence was precluded by earlier stipulation); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) (dicta favoring acceptance of
stipulated evidence); State v. A4rnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961) (possibility
of acceptance of a stipulation agreement implied); but cf. Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306
S.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. Ky. 1957) (oral agreement lacked sufficient formality to be a binding
stipulation); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.V.2d 172 (1951) (civil case disallowing
stipulation agreement because it was signed at the urging of the court); State v. Trimble,
68 N.M. 406, 408, 362 P.2d 788, 789 (1961) ("The signing of a waiver did not alter the
rule with regard to the admissibility of [polygraphic] evidence.').
126. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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considered the admissibility of polygraphic evidence upon stipulation. The
defendant Valdez claimed that despite a stipulation agreement he signed
before his polygraph test, the unfavorable results of that test should have
been excluded by the trial court as unreliable and lacking scientific
acceptance. 127 The Arizona supreme court agreed that the reliability and
scientific acceptance of the evidence did not merit admission, but was nonetheless impressed that the polygraph procedure had been "considerably improved
since Frye v. United States."'12 Believing that "[m]odern court procedure
must embrace recognized modern conditions of ... psychology . .. or other
sciences,"' 29 the court compromised between complete acceptance and complete rejection and allowed the admission of polygraphic evidence upon the
written stipulation of both parties, provided that: (1) the evidence is
merely corroborative in nature, or impeaching, but only if the defendant
takes the stand; (2) jury instructions stressing this corroborative role are
administered; (3) the polygraph expert is available for cross-examination
by the opposing party; and (4) the admission is at the discretion of the
trial court. 130
The Valdez standards have enjoyed substantial acceptance' 31 and appear
to offer some tenable compromises. First, insistance on a written stipulation
may be effective in discouraging endless haggling over misunderstood agreements, but the necessity for a precise writing could be employed improperly
by a party seeking to avoid an agreement that has become detrimental32
Second, restriction of the evidence to a corroborating role is consistent with
its marginal reliability; but this may severely curtail its admission because
parties do not usually stipulate to admit polygraphic evidence when substantial corroborative evidence exists. Furthermore, insistance on the
opportunity for cross-examination ensures that the examining party has an
opportunity to inform the jury of inaccuracies in the technique or biases in
127. Id. at 126, 371 P.2d at 895.
128. Id. at 282-83, 371 P.2d at 900. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
129. Id. at 282-83, 371 P.2d at 900-01.
130. Id.
131. Recently a number of courts with long tradition of inadmissibility have accepted
stipulated evidence following Valdez. See, e.g., Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F.
Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966) (the only federal decision on stipulation); Codie v. State, 313
So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975) (stipulation may be oral); The Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594
(Fla. 1970) (dicta); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 797 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); People v. Oswalt, 26
Ill. App. 3d 224, 324 N.E.2d 666 (Ct. App. 11. 1975) (dicta); McDonald v. State, 328
N.E.2d 436 (Ct. App. Ind. 1975) (dicta); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343
(Ct. App. 1972); State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8, 11-15 (1974).
132. In Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975), the Florida supreme court expressly
rejected defendant's contention that polygraphic evidence unfavorable to him should have
been excluded because the stipulation agreed to was merely oral. The court found that
"while it is true that Rule 1.030(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in order
to have any binding effect a stipulation must be in writing or must have been made in
open court and incorporated into the record, we find that this procedure is incorporated
in the Rules of Criminal Procedure only in connection with the procedures for stipulating
a waiver of the speedy trial rule. This negates the conclusion that the rule generally
applies to criminal cases." Id. at 756-57. See also, State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24 (2d D.CA.
Fla. 1966).
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the examiner; 1 33 arguably, however, if the parties have agreed to a test procedure and to an examiner before the test, they should be estopped from
attempting to discredit either. 13- Finally, permitting the trial judge discretion
to exercise his unique perspective prohibits incompetent or prejudicial
evidence; but if the judge must be convinced of the validity of the evidence
at each trial, the burden of re-litigating the issue may be intolerable. 135
Thus, some courts have accepted polygraphic evidence upon stipulation,
but have been unwilling to be bound by the particular standards of Valdez. 36
The most difficult compromise in Valdez concerns the effect of the stipulation agreement. Although in an adversary context parties may sometimes
contract to be bound by whatever evidence they desire, 137 the court has an
obvious public policy interest in excluding incompetent or prejudicial
evidence. A stipulation agreement does not increase the scientific acceptance
or the accuracy, nor does it decrease the prejudice of polygraphic evidence.
Soon after Valdez the Illinois supreme court complained:
[I]t is inconsistent for a court to affirm the unreliability of lie-detector
tests and at the same time admit into evidence the results of a stipulated
test. If such tests are as unpredictable and misleading as the courts are
so certain they are, then their reliability and usefulness to the court
and jury upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence remains
1 38
the same, regardless if they are admitted by stipulation or not.

Thus, some courts remain unpersuaded that stipulation resolves the problems
of polygraphic evidence and have been forced to reconsider the issue of
general admissibility as it may depend upon reliability, scientific acceptance,
and other factors. Such courts normally exclude polygraphic evidence
and also reject any attempt to admit it through stipulation.139 On the other
133. People v. Zazetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963) (failure of polygraph
operator to testify was an important reason to exclude stipulated evidence). See generally
F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (Collier ed. 1962).

134. This estoppel argument should find favor with courts who do not wish to bind
themselves by passing on the validity of polygraphy in general, but are compelled to
accept a stipulation agreement. See People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937
(Dist. Ct. App. 1948); contra, Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
Mass.
, 313 N.E.2d
120, 127 (1974).
135. United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
136. See, e.g., People v. Oswalt, 26 Ill. App. 3d 224, 324 N.E. 2d 666 (Ct. App. Ill. 1975);
McDonald v. State, 328 N.E.2d 436 (Ct. App. Ind. 1975); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334,
125 N.W.2d 825 (1964); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
137. See Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138 (1932)
(stipulations admitting specific types of expert or hearsay evidence generally approved;
agreements totally abrogating hearsay rule, or agreements seeking to exclude otherwise
admissible evidence, are usually objectionable).
138. People v. Zazetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 308, 189 N.E.2d 260, 269 (1963).
139. "A stipulation for admission does not increase the reliability of polygraph results
and therefore should not lead to any deviation from the exclusionary policy. Pulakis v.
State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alas. 1970); accord, People v. Guerin, 47 App. Div. 2d 788, 366
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); People v. Hargrove, 80 Misc. 2d 317, 321-22, 363 N.Y.S.2d, 241, 245
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (dicta); State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1963)
(decision appeared in reporters eleven years late and so had no effect on developing
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hand, those that feel the evidence has gained sufficiently in stature to be

admitted, see no reason to restrict admission to circumstances of stipulation.140
Stipulations regarding polygraph results may go beyond agreements for
admissibility of evidence and provide for the release of the defendant if the
polygraphic results are favorable to him, insisting on his guilty plea if they
are unfavorable. Two Florida cases upheld such stipulations, arguing that
agreements made by the sovereign should be enforced for public policy reasons,
regardless of the status of the polygraph test.1 41 Enforcement of the agreement against the defendant seems less likely, however, in view of the
attempted dispensation with trial and the questionable status of the guilty
plea. First, because no trial is contemplated, neither the polygraph expert
nor the test results can be examined critically. 4 2 The possibilities of collusion
between the prosecutor and the polygraph operator are obvious. Even if
the test and the results are fair and unbiased, the effect has been trial by
machine rather than trial by a court of law.
Further, there is serious doubt as to whether a contingent guilty plea is
ever valid. Such a plea may violate the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court in Brady v. United States 43 that a guilty plea, as a -waiver of the

constitutional right of trial, "not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent, [and] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant

case law). Hargrove and Guerin were extensions of language in Pereira v. Pereira, 32
N.Y.2d 301, 361 N.Y.S.2d 413, 319 N.E.2d 413 (1974) mentioning that stipulations were
inadequate reasons to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence. The holding in Pereira was
reconcilable with Valdez, though, as admission of stipulated evidence was denied because
the stipulation agreement failed to provide for admissibility. Some courts have refused to
allow stipulated polygraphic evidence for miscellaneous reasons. See, e.g., Stack v. State,
234 Ga. 19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975) (by implication); State v. Jackson, 24 N.C. App. 394,
402, 210 S.E.2d 876, 881 (Ct. App. 1975) (polygraph has no place in the courts); Reed v.
State, 522 S.W.2d 466 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1975) (dicta); State v. Woo, 84 Wash. 2d
472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974) (discussion without decision).
140. Convinced of the reliability of polygraphic evidence, the court in State v. Dorsey,
87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1975), felt obliged to admit the evidence without
stipulation. Compare the opinion of a concurring justice that ". . . the reliability of
polygraph examinations is so doubtful . . . it seems incongruous that polygraph examinations should be admitted under any circumstances . . ." Id. at 326, 532 P.2d at 915 (Sutin,
J., concurring).
141. Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1969); State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d
24 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
142. In State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), the problem of an inconclusive result arose. The first polygraph test given to the defendant cleared him,
but a subsequent examiner requested by this state viewed the first results as inconclusive,
and prosecution ensued. The court held that the state was estopped to object about the
diagnosis of the first agreed-upon examiner. In Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (4th D.CA.
Fla. 1969), the state objected that the questions asked by the examiner were inadequate
to make the polygraph diagnosis definitive. Rather than relying on the estoppel theory
of Davis, the court examined the questions itself and pronounced them adequate. The
willingness of the court to appoint itself an expert in a technical field is unusual.
143. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Brady faced the question of whether a guilty plea entered
in response to a threat of capital punishment attending a jury trial was invalid.
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circumstances and likely consequences.'" 144 If a defendant believes in his
innocence sufficiently to submit to a polygraph test it is incongruous to
contend that he voluntarily and in the absence of coercion entered a guilty
plea. Moreover, he can hardly have sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences when the outcome of the test is
still unknown.
Such considerations suggest that plea stipulations should be controlled
by the courts, regardless of how significantly they would reduce caseloads.
Binding stipulations are unnecessary to reduce caseloads, because prosecutors
may exercise their discretion in refusing to prosecute those defendants who
have taken polygraph tests successfully, even though the defendants have
not promised to plead guilty if the test had incriminated them. 145
Confessions to the Polygraph Examiner
A subject may make incriminating responses or a total confession to the
examiner. So common are confessions under the pressure of the test that
one writer has remarked that the "chief function" of the polygraph "appears
to be to induce confessions by deception"'14 and has estimated that a confession
is secured in 50-70 percent of all polygraph tests.1 4 7 Although barred from
testifying to the results of the test, a polygraph operator is free to testify about
a confession or incriminating statement made to him during its course.
Before Miranda v. Arizona 148 the standard applied to the admissibility
of confessions or incriminating statements was that of voluntariness.'" 9 Courts
inspected all the relevant circumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether the defendant had exercised his free choice.' 50 Coerced confessions were not voluntary and therefore were untrustworthy; furthermore,
they offended the "community's sense of fair play and decency."'' 1 Miranda
added to voluntariness the requirement that a defendant questioned in
custody must have knowingly waived his right to remain silent before his
confession will be admissible.152 As a polygraph test involves interrogation
and the possibility of self-incrimination,' 53 it should be preceded by a Miranda
144. Id.
145. The result reached in United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) is
consistent with this policy. On the use of prosecutorial discretion, see Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
146. J. REID &e F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 168 (1966).
147. Id.
148. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
149. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The principal concern of
the Court was the untrustworLhiness a coerced confession would exhibit. See also Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)

(applying federal standards to the states).

150. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (difficult to draw line between
coercion and permissive interrogation); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (coercion
from extended questioning).
151. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The concern over police methods as
opposed to mere trustworthiness has increased in recent years. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 455, 457 (1966); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). See nQte 162 infra,
152.

384 U.S. at 436.

153. See note 90 supra.
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warning to the subject in custody. If the subject thereafter consents to the
test, subsequent admissions or confessions will be evaluated according to the
traditional voluntariness criteria.1Courts have consistently held that use of a polygraph is not per se
coercive: "the use of a lie detector in the process of interrogation does not
render a subsequent confession involuntary or inadmissible."' 55 Apparently,
the examiner may falsely advise the subject that the polygraph is infallible.156
He may also remark during a test that the subject is eliciting "gross deceptive
patterns" and is obviously lying, whether or not such patterns are actually
57
evident.'
According to Professor Inbau, "psychological tactics and techniques as
trickery and deceit [are] not only helpful but frequently necessary in order
to secure incriminating information from the guilty."'15 Such tactics, if likely
to make the innocent confess, are unacceptable. 59 Having obtained a waiver,
however, the police are free to use a broad range of psychological manipulation. In Frazier v. Cupp 60 the Supreme Court held that even when police
knowingly and falsely informed the defendant that co-conspirators had confessed, the coercion was not such as to preclude a voluntary confession.' 6 '
Under such circumstances, a defendant who is unaware that polygraphic
evidence may be inadmissible at trial may have free choice in name but not
in fact.'0 2
Polygraph tests are often given by private examiners rather than by the
police. If the subject is in police custody when examined, private polygraphers are treated as police agents, to whom the requirements of Miranda

154. See Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1975); State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 14,
319 A.2d 450, 459 (1974) (confession to polygraph operator subsequent to Miranda warning
admissible); Jones v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 247, 249 (Va. 1974) (admission to polygraph operator before test but after Miranda warnings was not influenced in such a way
as to create doubt of its truth).
155. United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir. 1964); accord, Johnson v.
State, 166 So. 2d 798 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). See State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 187 A.2d
230 (1962); Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 3, 3 A.2d 353 (1939); State v. DeHart, 242
Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943).
156. Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939) (subject warned, "you
can't lie to the machine.').
157. State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975)
(confession voluntary).
158. Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16
(1961).
159. Id. at 18.
160. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
161. Id. at 739. The police behavior was relevant but insufficient to render an otherwise voluntary confession involuntary.
162. The deceitful use of the polygraph to secure a confession illustrates what may
be the most cogent objection to polygraph use. According to one commentator "[iun the
administration of justice, truth is but a means, whereas dignity is an end. Criminal justice
would be devoid of meaning were it incidentally to deny the very human dignity which
is its ultimate purpose to protect." Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases,
69 HAIv. L. Rav. 683, 690 (1956).
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apply. 16 3 If the subject seeks the examiner on his own or his employer's
initiative,' action by the examiner is not attributable to the state and no
Miranda warnings need be given. As a subject theoretically is less likely
to be coerced by his own examiner, the presumption of voluntariness in incriminating admissions is strong. Similarly, a subject cannot object that his
1 65
belief in the confidentiality of the interview was mistaken.
It is generally held that evidence of the defendant's having taken a
polygraph test, 66 or even of his willingness 167 or unwillingness 68 to do so,
is inadmissible. Such evidence is thought to be unavoidably prejudicial.
If a prosecutor asserts that a defendant has taken a polygraph test, but is
compelled to refrain from disclosing the outcome, the jury will probably
conclude that the test was unfavorable to the defendant. Likewise, if the
prosecutor asserts that the defendant was unwilling to submit to a test, the
jury may mistakenly infer consciousness of guilt. 6 9 Furthermore, in neither
situation will the defendant have the opportunity to attack the accuracy of
the technique or the competence of the operator.
163. On the application of Miranda standards to private individuals acting in concert
with the police, see Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1972); State v. Kelley, 113
N.J. Super. 169, 273 A.2d 371 (1971), modified, 61 N.J. 283, 294 A.2d 41 (1972) (private investigator); State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971) (private investigator).
See generally United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351 (3d Cir. 1972); Stapleton v. Superior Ct.,
70 Cal. 2d 87, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968) (inherently governmental task may
imply police agency).
164. In United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1964), the examiner was a
private consultant called in by defendant's employer. The confession was ruled voluntary.
165. Communications with private individuals are undertaken at the risk of the
communicator. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the fact that the defendant's
confidence in a secret informer for the police was misplaced did not affect the otherwise
voluntary nature of the conversations. Nor should the fact that the polygraph test may be
recorded affect the voluntary nature of the disclosures. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952) (concealed recording device on secret informer; remarks held voluntary); Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
166. Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798, 802 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Stack v. State, 234
Ga. 19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975). But the error may sometimes be cured through jury instruction. Reed v. State, 522 S.W.2d 466 (Crim. App. Tex. 1975).
167. People v. Thornton, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267 (1974); People v. Carter, 48
Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) (innocent suspect may fear false response, but guilty
subject, knowing of inadmissibility, has nothing to lose).
168. When mention is made that the defendant was unwilling to submit to a polygraph test, "[t]he inference would be quickly and erroneously drawn from refusal to
consciousness of guilt to guilt." State v. Mottram, 184 A.2d 225, 229 (Me. 1962). But Mottram
suggested that if evidence was offered showing that the defendant actually believed in
the validity of the test, refusal might legitimately show consciousness of guilt. In this
connection, see State v. Wisdom, 119 Mo. 539, 24 S.W. 1047 (1894) (refusal to submit to
a superstitious test showing consciousness of guilt). The state cannot extract a penalty
from a defendant who exercises his fifth amendment right in declining a polygraph test.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on defendant's failure to take the
stand is impermissible. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976) (fundamentally unfair
to allow an arrestee's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently given
at trial).
169. The defendant may have been unwilling to submit to the test because he doubted
its validity. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
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This general rule of inadmissibility seems to conflict with the courts'
compulsion to examine all the relevant circumstances surrounding a confession.170 If a confession is secured during a polygraph test, the test is highly
7

relevant to the voluntariness of the confession. In Tyler v. United States' '

the defendant confessed after being informed during a polygraph test that
the machine indicated he was lying. As there had been suggestions of physical
abuse, the defendant challenged the confession, but it was admitted subject
to a final determination of voluntariness by the jury. 72 At the trial, the
prosecution presented not only the fact that the defendant had taken a
polygraph test, but also that the examiner had informed the defendant of
the latter's deception. Holding such evidence admissible as relevant to the
circumstances leading to the confession, the court of appeals noted, "[t]he
statement of the witness that he told the defendant that the machine indicated
he was lying is not admitted as evidence of any alleged lying of the defendant,
but merely as evidence bearing upon the question whether the confession was
voluntary."'173 Courts are in general agreement with Tyler that mention of a
polygraph test is permitted when it affects the "vital question as to whether
[a confession] was voluntary."'-4
The related issue of who may mention the test is unresolved. In State
v. Green,17 5 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a prosecutor cannot be
the first party to introduce evidence of a defendant's polygraph test. The
prosecutor, in an attempt to present the "totality of the circumstances" indicating the voluntariness of the defendant's confession, introduced the details
of two previous tests, complete with specific responses and the examiner's
opinion regarding the subject's truthfulness.7 6 Viewing the "danger of prejudice [as] so great as to . . . outweigh the probative value,"' 177 the supreme

court reversed and held that the evidence should have been excluded. The
prosecutor is not barred from introducing such evidence entirely, however:
If ... when the confession is offered in evidence, the defendant then
objects to the confession upon the ground that the confession was
not voluntary because of a preceding polygraph examination, the state
may then offer in evidence not only the fact that the confession was
given following a polygraph examination, but also such details of the
170. The court in Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798, 803 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1964), noted
that: "Necessarily, when a confession procured during or as a result of a lie detector
examination is challenged, the facts surrounding the confession will be disclosed." The

court cited People v. Lettrich, 413 IM.172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952), .for the additional proposition that it is error "to limit defense efforts to explore the details of a lie detector
examination eventuating in a confession." Id. at 803.
171.
172.
173.
174.
v. State,

193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29. Accord, United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1964); Roberts
195 So. 2d 257 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1967); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (2d D.C.A.

Fla. 1964).
175. 271 Ore. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (Ore. 1975).
176. Id. at 249.
177. Id. at 253.
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polygraph examination, including evidence which may reveal the
results of the examination, as may be relevant upon the question
whether the confession was given voluntarily. 178
Following Green, then, the defendant has the choice "as to whether or not
he wants to inject the polygraph issue into the case for the purpose of
attempting to show that it or the technique was a coercive factor which
compelled the defendant to confess." 179 This policy seems well-reasoned and
deserves substantial following.
SUMMARY

In the years since its introduction to polygraphy, the judiciary has
resolutely insisted upon, and the scientific community continuously failed
to provide, some measure of general scientific acceptance. Lately, in a belief
that the scientific community has had ample time to evaluate the accuracy
and theoretical sufficiency of polygraphy, some courts have argued that it
is time for the judiciary to evaluate polygraphy on its own. Because the
judiciary's requirements for theoretical sufficiency differ from those of the
scientific community, the courts arguably should not look for scientific
acceptance in this area. But sufficient accuracy is a necessity for usefulness
in both science and law, and courts must be satisfied that polygraphy enjoys
sufficient accuracy in the particular case in which it is being used to meet
the test of relevancy. Although experiments are difficult to generalize, the
available evidence suggests that polygraphy can be accurate enough for
judicial use.
The admissibility of polygraphic evidence depends upon its relevancy,
discounted by its prejudicial effect. With its scientific trapping, polygraph's
ability to influence the jury is considerable. This influence may be unwarranted,
because a fallible human, not an impeccable instrument, actually makes
the diagnosis of truth and deception. Thus a court must consider whether
twelve jurors should be replaced not by a polygraph machine but by a
polygraph operator.
Like most judicial considerations, the merits of admissibility may be
affected by the factual setting. When polygraphic evidence has important
exculpatory value to a defendant, the case for admission is strong. If the
parties agree to introduce this evidence, the court may content itself with
a cursory examination of its reliability. Likewise, the facts of a polygraph
examination may have an important bearing on the voluntariness of a
defendant's confession, and an artificial evidentiary bar should not preclude
him from presenting all the relevant circumstances.
178. Id. at 254.
179. Id. at 253. See Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798, 802 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) ("[Wlhile
neither party should be permitted to allude to a witness or a defendant having taken a lie
detector test, a defendant who initiates the inquiry, without objection from the state, and

attempts to prove consciousness of innocence, cannot then complain when the state
[unsuccessfully] attempts to pursue the subject."). Accord, Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474
(Alas. 1972).
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Polygraphy is a technique that can make an enormous impact on the
trial system. In the words of one commentator, "[t]he issue before us is
whether we are to abandon our traditional system of adversary litigation
with emphasis upon dignity for 'scientific' trial with emphasis on truth."1 s 0
The conflict is perhaps inevitable, and the courts' failure to face up to the
central issues in the use of scientific detection only suggests that the eventual
impact will be all the more drastic. The judiciary should now take cautious
steps toward integrating the science of polygraphy with the law so that its
limitations and strengths may be exposed, clarified, and made an object of
judicial and public understanding.
NORWOOD S. WILNER
180.

Silving, supra note 162, at 691.
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